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of Russia is impeded by the political system of Russia
which rejects all the attempts to modernise it. The
existing contradiction has resulted from the process of
the formation of market institutions and mechanisms
under the conditions of absence of political culture of
democracy. The interests of the political and bureau-
cratic elite are poorly compatible with democratic in-
stitutions. The political circles simulate democratic
reforms by way of creating institutional simulacra
which are a semblance of public participation in
making decisions and an oversight of their imple-
mentation and, in reality, are not supported by appro-
priate channels and mechanisms to perform the
functions. The situation is clearly visible on the
regional level, which reveals the attempts of the au-
thorities to achieve economic efficiency by optimising
bureaucratic structures and organising surrogate forms
of public activity.
Nowadays, there is no need to justify and ground
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recognised by scholars, analysts, and politicians.
However, the paradox and dramatic character of the
situation is that the issue of the modernistaion is not
consistent with the structure of the Russian political
system which, institutionally and procedurally, accords
only with the regime concentrating all processes on the
vertical of the executive authority and is, for the time
being, successfully rejecting all attempts to modernise
it. The constructive peculiarity of the system is “that it
focuses on maintaining the status-quo (distributing
economic assets and power resources, first of all) and is
not aimed at the modernisation development” [2].
In 2008, acknowledging the regional policy pursued
in the Russian Federation unsatisfactory the State
represented by the president and the government
declared they had adopted a new strategy meeting the
‘requirements of the reality’. As President Putin said,
“it requires a modern system of regional planning
which should avoid any excessive regulation from the
federal authority” [6]. Such an approach should have
been based on the strategies advanced by the regions
themselves with the participation of a wide circle of
persons and structures taking decisions and creating a
political field, within which they would have estab-
lished political alliances and looked for compromisesniversity, Dalian University of Technology, Kokushikan University.
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ness, public organisations, the court, and the press as
the fourth branch of power. However, the expectations
the new strategy made one entertain contradicted the
features peculiar to Putin's political regime, under
which the regions, in fact, have lost their status of
political subjects. In order to solve the tasks of eco-
nomic development of the regions, the State habitually
set in motion the executive echelon of power and
virtually eliminated all the above mentioned actors
from the ranks of the subjects making decisions.
Eventually the State turned out to be the only gamer on
the political field. All regional authority bodies and
departments became functional extensions of the fed-
eral administrative machine beginning with the pleni-
potentiary representative of the President and ending
with the administrations of the municipal districts.
Speaking before the Federal Assembly in 2008, the
then president Dmitry Medvedev clearly pointed to the
interrelation between the economic modernisation and
the political one and he emphasised that the former
could not be achieved without the latter. In 2010, in his
material Our Democracy Is Not Perfect and We Are
Aware of It. But We Go Forward published on the
president's website, he made an objective assessment of
the development of the Russian political system and
focused his special attention on the symptoms of
stagnation and the danger that stability would trans-
form into a factor of stagnation. Mr. Medvedev stressed
that the principle task for Russia was to make the
representation of the people more pronounced, so that
“the political majority was not merely static and the
ruling party had both rights and obligations without
being only an appendage to the executive power […]
The political system must be so structured that the
opinions of each social group including the smallest
ones should be clearly heard, and, ideally, even the
voice of one person should be heard” [3].
Although he clearly expressed the thought that
Russia needed a political modernisation, Mr. Medve-
dev could not cross the boundaries of the system that
had been established before his presidentship. “A
consequence of the ‘modernisation without policy’ is
the system, in which the domineering bureaucracy is
almost entirely independent from the institutions of
public policy” [4].
It is quite understandable that the roots of the
problem lie in the peculiarities of the Russian transi-
tional period: the transition to a market economy and
democratic political regime occurred in circumstances
when there were no economic, political and social
structures complying with the requirements of the newsystem, which caused the inability of the Russian so-
ciety to influence on the choice of the country's course
of development. The choice was made by a narrow
circle of State officials who had clearly specified in-
terests of their own, who possessed a management
experience and had an access to resources. The priva-
tisation of the State property secured them a lifetime
‘administrative annuity’ and it was on the base of that
appropriation that today's political class of Russia was
formed [1]. The existence of this class is not compat-
ible with the democratic political process implying that
wide circles of interested organisations and persons are
involved into the mechanism of making and imple-
menting decisions and, in such a way, acquire the
qualities of political subjects. The openness, trans-
parency, and deliberativeness accompanying the dem-
ocratisation of the process of political participation
undermine the conditions that enable the political bu-
reaucracy to control monopolistically the State re-
sources, which makes the sources of its wealth
uncontrolled by the society. The political modernisa-
tion is a real threat not only to the wellbeing of the
bureaucratic elite but also to its very existence.
The effort to prevent a real democratic process has
determined the imitation model of the Russian de-
mocracy basing on poor capacity of constitutional in-
stitutions as well as on establishing structures which
duplicate their functions under the supervision of the
executive power all over the so-called “verticality”. Mr.
Putin's coming to power put an end to the period of
spontaneous democracy under Boris Yeltsin's presi-
dentship. The political regime stabilised and the dual
nature of the Russian State established itself on all the
levels of the economic and political systems. Accord-
ing a certain researcher, the political actors “did not
follow the structures and rules that ensured the
framework for order, but adapted the structures and
rules to their own objectives and, at the same time, they
created new ones which supported the regime and
concurrently circumvented the formal constitutional
order” [7].
The Russian society, which, for seventy years,
existed in circumstances of the discordance between
the proclaimed principles of the organisation and dis-
tribution of power functions and the actual practice of
the Soviet State clearly having it introduced into the
mass consciousness, up to the present has been unable
to realise that the democratic mechanisms and pro-
cesses have been substituted by simulations. The
simulations radically changing the meaning of de-
mocracy discredit the idea and conceal the selfish aims
of the ruling elite. The lack of alternative has become a
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anteed irremovability of the power elite determines its
stability and simultaneously it is one of the chief
causes making the political system of Russia unable to
develop democratically. Removability is realisable
through competitiveness and elections. Free elections
and competitiveness create a danger of losing not only
political but also economic positions, whereas irre-
movability guarantees the retentions of the achieved
status. In these circumstances, the political practice is
such that it produces institutional simulacra. The pro-
cess is clearly visible in the regions demonstrating the
efforts of the authorities to achieve economic effi-
ciency through the optimisation of bureaucratic struc-
tures and the organisation of surrogate forms of social
activity. The change in the structure of the Federation
Council has resulted in the removal of the regional
authorities from the process of making decisions and
deprived the regions of their status of subjects which
they have in accordance with the constitution declaring
the principles of federalism. The governors authorised
by the local society and having political influence have
been replaced by officials appointed by Moscow. The
positions of the senators of the federal legislative body
whose duty is to represent the regions and protect their
interests have been filled with retired Moscow gen-
erals, sportsmen or regional delegates of no political
importance both in the Centre and provinces. The re-
gions have been doomed to be passive; they “do not act
as initiators, subjects of innovations but as objects,
recipients of the initiatives of the federal Centre, as
platforms to carry out federal projects. All decisions
determining the life of the regions are made by the
government which takes into consideration, first of all,
the interest of the Centre. The governors and mayors
become ‘auxiliary bodies’ as well as regional parlia-
ments do” [5].
The undertaken reforms aimed to beat a path to
democracy do not change the situation. The fact that,
henceforth, the institution of senators must be formed
only from the number of persons elected to the
representative power bodies and that of deputies of the
local government agencies of the pertinent subject of
the Federation makes no sense since the residence
requirement has been cancelled. It means, in practice,
that the office may be filled by any appointee from the
Centre.
The issue of decentralisation has been discussed
currently by the representatives of the federal power.
Suggested within the context of the development of
democratic principles in the system of government it is
treated uniquely within the limits of the executiveechelon, of which part is also the party United Russia.
Domineering everywhere and among the political
parties of the subjects of the Federation as well, it is
capable to initiate and approve any decisions taken by
the executive power. Despite the representatives of the
United Russia eagerly deny the use of it, the so-called
administrative resource cannot but work for the party
in power which is an official component of the
administrative machine. The qualified majority of the
members of the party in the legislative power condition
the existence of today's political system. The election
of heads of city administrations by the city dumas in
which the majority will be guaranteed for the repre-
sentatives of the party in power will bring the executive
vertical to a logical completion: at last, the governors
will gain power over the budgets of the regional
centres.
Along with the isolated and irrelevant changes in
the field of election process and the partial rotation of
the heads of the legislative and executive bodies of the
subjects of the Russian Federation, the reform of the
party legislation easing the requirements to register
political parties is yet another democratic simulation.
In fact, it not only did nothing to promote the demo-
cratisation of the election process but it also generated
a phenomenon of the so-called ‘spoiler parties’
engaged as part of the administrative resource by the
regional administrations to draw votes away from un-
wanted candidates.
The recent trend has been towards the attempts to
create a more attractive political design of the power
structures rather than a modernisation of the system.
The aim is to maintain the existing political regime and
retain its basic characteristics. It is reflected, in
particular, in the fact that a more democratic character
has been imparted to the model of political relations in
service: the social basis of the political regime has
been widened through the attraction of the most active
members of society to the consultative zone of the
power. The primaries initiated by the United Russia
party when determining candidates to fill the offices of
party leaders of all levels as well as the obligatory
participation of party members in public debates are
aimed at activating the competitiveness within the
party itself rather than achieving a free inter-party
competition. As Dmitry Medvedev pointed out in the
above-mentioned article, if the opposition has no
chance to win in fair competition, it degrades and be-
comes marginal, whereas the ruling party that has no
chances to lose simply stagnates and eventually de-
grades, too, as any living organism does when
immobilised.
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having no plenary power, the institution of civic
chambers has become another simulation of a demo-
cratic communication between the authorities and the
society. According to the concept, the civic chambers
were to exempt the legislative and representative
bodies of State power both of regional and federal level
from the constitutionally determined role of exponents
of the society's interests, which lost its meaning in the
established constitutional order as well as in the real
political practice. Instead of being part of the activities
of the State Duma, the platform for communication
and discussion has been shifted to the civic chambers
to which the political analysts refer as a ‘non-political
parliament’ (that is, a powerless one) and a ‘collective
ombudsman’. Aimed to act as a mechanism of feed-
back, it provides a way of letting off steam as well
before the conflict situation may take a bad turn posing
a threat to the regime.
The practice of the regions of the Russian Far East
demonstrates that the regional political regime could
not allow any control, even a loose one, by the society
and tried to avoid any information on its activities
being leaked beyond the limits of a narrow circle of
government officials. That is why all the civic cham-
bers that had come into being on the wave of social
enthusiasm very quickly transformed into official
consultative bodies under the governors. Replacing the
odious figure of Sergey Darkin, Governor of the
Maritime Province (Primorsky Kray), with the Mos-
cow appointee Vladimir Miklushevsky, who, unlike the
former, had no links with local economic groups or
interests in local economic affairs, pursued the goal to
reinforce controllability over the region. The immedi-
ate task was to make the region more attractive for
potential investors by securing political stability in it.
The media activity, the multi-month campaign to
establish seventeen coordination councils subordinate
to the governor, the reanimation of the idea ruined by
Sergey Darkin to establish a civic chamber, the
pompous meetings with the inhabitants of the region
and journalists arranged for the governor by the
regional administration as well as the ‘civil referenda’
under the slogan of reforming the national political
system suggested more often than not by the United
Russia party are only few lines of the new governor's
activity aimed to democratise the political process in
the region.
However, the pseudo-democratic nature of the ac-
tions does not pass unnoticed by the regional society.
One of the most respectable and by no means oppo-
sitional newspapers of Vladivostok representing thepositions of the regional business society described the
civil referendum as a large-scale political project
realised with the use of the resources of the authorities
of various levels which pursued no objectives to really
renew the power or develop democracy in the indi-
vidual territory. According to the regional analysts, the
measure afforded no optional chance to ‘random per-
sons’ to arrive at power; more than that, it was intended
to neutralise the critical attitude of the local public by
creating channels to release their criticism and, in such
a way, to avoid uncontrolled actions and movements of
protest that could expand from the regional centre to
the provinces.
The society expressed the similar opinion about the
Governor Miklushevky's initiative which was widely
advertised that seventeen expert councils attached to his
office would be established to direct State programmes.
According to the conclusions drawn by aMoscow expert
group after it visited Vladivostok, Mr. Miklushevsky
began ‘to generate simulacra’ in the Maritime Province,
because the activity of such public organisations is
consistent neither with the legislation nor political
practice and it cannot correct or improve the imple-
mentation of the State programmes. The latter being
drawn up, the problems of the region being presented in
them, the finances distributed, their implementation is
under the supervision of the State officials, whereas the
expert councils have no credentials to do that. It is
generally acknowledged that these and other ways the
governor searches for to cooperatewith the society work
to appease the public rather than to make it an actor of
political, economic, and social processes equal in rights
with the authorities themselves.
In the long run, as the political analysts say and
write, only democracy and federalism can give us an
opportunity for development. To achieve the goal, real
competitive conditions should be created both in po-
litical and economic spheres beginning with the
transformation of the system representing the interests
of the regions and ending with the establishment of the
channels involving the regional society, through which
the political and non-political organisations and com-
munities could influence on the formation and imple-
mentation of the inner and external regional policy and
the development of horizontal communications.References
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